We investigate the effect of declining house prices on household consumption behavior during [2006][2007][2008][2009]. We use an individual-level dataset that has detailed information on borrower characteristics, mortgages and credit risk. Proxying consumption by individual-level auto loan originations, we decompose the effect of declining house prices on consumption into three main channels: wealth effect, household financial constraints, and bank health. We find a negligible wealth effect. Tightening householdlevel financial constraints can explain 40-45 percent of the response of consumption to declining house prices. Deteriorating bank health leads to reduced credit supply both to households and firms. Our dataset allows us to estimate the effect of this on households as 20-25 percent of the consumption response. The remaining 35 percent is a general equilibrium effect that works via a decline in employment as a result of either lower credit supply to firms or the feedback from lower consumer demand. Our estimate of a negligible wealth effect is robust to accounting for the endogeneity of house prices and unemployment. The contribution of tightening household financial constraints goes down to 35 percent, whereas declining bank credit supply to households captures about half of the overall consumption response, once we account for endogeneity.
Introduction
The U.S. economy experienced a large financial crisis together with a housing bust in [2007] [2008] . A deep recession with significant declines of consumption, investment, and employment has followed. Although there is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature on the causes and consequences of the crisis, so far, there is still no consensus on the role of the channels linking the housing bust to the recession.
There have been three main narratives of the crisis put forth in the literature. The first narrative is a wealth shock to consumers via a decline in their housing wealth, which leads them to cut their consumption, and this in turn leads to a decline in output. Mian and Sufi (2009) , Mian and Sufi (2011) , and Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) have been the main proponents of this view, where an increase in household leverage predict the subsequent crisis, de-leveraging and consumption decline. They show empirically a strong relationship between these variables and argue that the recession is due to this demand channel via declining consumption.
1 The second narrative is about households being financially constrained as a result of a shock to their housing wealth. When house values go down, the value of housing collateral falls and households' borrowing constraints get tighter, which in turn might prevent them from borrowing. Berger, Guerrieri, Lorenzoni, and Vavra (2015) and Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante (2016) have proposed models where this channel is important for the decline in consumption and the associated recession. Aladangady (2017) provides empirical support for this channel, where a large part of the response of consumption to changing house values are driven by credit-constrained households. The final narrative is about shocks to the financial sector, which tighten this sector's financial constraints, in turn reducing credit supply to both households and firms. Households decrease consumption as a result, and firms cut down employment and investment. There is an extensive empirical debate on the effect of reduced credit supply on firm employment. While Duygan-Bump, Levkov, and MontoriolGarriga (2015) and Greenstone, Mas, and Nguyen (2015) find that reduced credit supply can only account for less than one-tenth of the decline in employment, Chodorow-Reich (2014), Chen, Hanson, and Stein (2017) and Gilchrist, Siemer, and Zakrajsek (2017) find that up to one-third of the employment decline may be driven by bank shocks.
Our goal in this paper is to quantify each of these narratives using detailed individual-level data, which include mortgage and credit risk information. We know from the existing literature that shocks to house values create a large consumption response at an aggregate (ZIP Figure 1 shows all of the possible channels that will lead to lower consumption as a result of an exogenous decline in house prices, where we show three players in the same locality:
consumers, banks and firms. First, on the household side, we argue that as a result of declining house prices, there will be both a wealth effect, denoted with the arrow "household wealth," and a collateral shock effect, denoted with the arrow "household financial constraints." Although there are models that combine these effects under a single wealth effect, 2 we argue that their effects have to be quantified separately. Why is this important?
In the standard permanent income model, a shock to housing wealth will have no effect on consumption since positive endowment effects will be canceled out by negative cost of living effects, as shown by Buiter (2008) . In the context of the life-cycle model, if homeowners are likely to sell their house in the future, there can be positive wealth effects via rising house prices as modeled by Sinai and Souleles (2005) . In terms of the current debate, many theory papers argue that, to be able to match the large responses of consumption to house prices changes found in the data by Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) , one needs collateralized lending that amplifies the impact of housing wealth on consumption.
3 Our individual-level data and methodology will allow us to separate these effects.
Next, as shown in the figure, there is the effect of house price declines on bank health.
If banks are exposed to the real estate market, housing price declines constitute a negative balance sheet shock to banks, which results in banks cutting credit supply both to households and firms. As argued by Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (forthcoming) an increase in credit supply is the only force that can match the empirical regularities in the boom period. They argue that looser borrowing constraints cannot account all for the facts since they only shift the demand for credit. In their model these forces interact, with a lending constraint on the bank side and a household borrowing constraint that are both in play during the boom-bust phase. They argue that in the models without an exogenous credit supply decline, tightening of the household borrowing constraint put upward pressure on interest rates, which has not been observed during the boom phase. Hence, we believe it is important to quantify this effect separately from the previous ones.
4
Lower credit supply to firms will lead to lower employment and investment. As argued above, there is a debate in the empirical literature on the size of this effect. Another possible channel is, as shown by the dotted arrow, a collateral shock to firms' balance sheet if firms' owners use their own housing wealth as collateral to get loans to invest and to produce.
5
We will not be able to study this channel, since we do not have information on firms' or their owners' real estate wealth. In addition, as a results of low consumption, demand for firms' output will be lower, which will also lead firms to decrease employment, as shown by the "local demand" arrow, following the work of Mian and Sufi as cited above. Any firm-level response via lower employment will feed back to lower consumption because of general equilibrium, as shown by the bottom arrow. We will be able to identify these effects collectively using county-level employment.
Not only the literature that studies the Great Recession but also the broad literature that tries to understand the effect of house prices and housing wealth on consumption takes by and large an aggregate approach. The early literature uses time series data from the U.S. as a whole, and the later literature uses geographic variation across states or counties. In either case, aggregate time-series and cross-sectional correlations make identification hard. For example, expectations about future income, can drive both consumption patterns and house prices. As shown by Attanasio, Blow, Hamilton, and Leicester (2009) and Calomiris, Longhofer, and Miles (2009) , the strong aggregate relation between house prices and consumption shown by Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2005) , Carroll and Kimball (1996) , and Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek (2011) goes away once expectations of income and other common factors are controlled. Attanasio, Blow, Hamilton, and Leicester (2009) is an early paper that shows similar responses from renters and homeowners, which again indicates the existence of common factors in aggregate data. Demyanyk, Hryshko, Luengo-Prado, and Sørensen (2015) also show that unemployment, income, and debt are important determinants of consumption in the aggregate data.
In the aggregate data, there can also be an omitted variable problem related to compositional changes in the population, such as the effect of age on housing demand. Both Calomiris, Longhofer, and Miles (2012) and Campbell and Cocco (2007) show that age profile is very important for the relation between housing wealth and consumption where older cohorts have larger response. 6 In the context of the Great Recession, two set of authors challenged findings of Mian and Sufi also based on compositional effects. Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2017) and Albanesi, De Giorgi, and Nosal (2017) argue that credit growth between 2001 and 2007 was concentrated in the prime segment, debt to high risk borrowers was virtually constant for all debt categories during this period, and default among high income prime borrowers were common during the post period. 7 They argue that results of Mian and Sufi confound life-cycle debt demand of borrowers who were young at the start of the boom with an expansion in credit supply over that period.
Our unique dataset will help us to solve this identification problem caused by using aggregate data, and help us to identify the channels outlined above in Figure 1 . We use individual-level data from two sources that gives us most detail to date in terms of individual 6 See also Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2018) . 7 Albanesi, De Giorgi, and Nosal (2017) also use individual-level data from one of the datasets we use, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York/Equifax Consumer Credit Panel, but focus on growth in mortgage debt prior to crisis and subsequent defaults rather than consumption response as we do. mortgages and Equifax Risk Scores. Our first dataset is the Federal Reserve Bank of New York/Equifax Consumer Credit Panel (CCP), a quarterly database of consumer credit bureau records for a random 5 percent sample of consumers with a credit bureau record. Our second dataset is a match between credit bureau data with more detailed information on residential first mortgages from loan servicing data. This matched dataset is Equifax Credit Risk Insight Servicing (Equifax Credit) and Black Knight McDash (McDash), known as CRISM. We then restrict attention to those borrowers who can be found in the CCP. As a result we have a random representative sample of borrower-level information on all loans of the borrower, including any auto loans; theborrower's Equifax Risk Score; the borrower's age; and detailed characteristics of the borrower's mortgages, most notably the appraised value of the property and the type of mortgage.
As a proxy for consumption, we use a binary variable at the individual-level that represents the origination of an auto loan in 2009. This resembles the ZIP code-level new car registration data that Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) use in their analysis, and it has certain advantages, which we discuss in detail. The most important advantage is that it is at the individual level. Using an individual-level measure of consumption, we are able to see how a decline in housing wealth affects consumption, once we control for various aggregate variables. To further dissect the effects, we are also able to focus on various subgroups in the population based on their borrower characteristics.
In addition to changes in house prices, we have five main controls: first and foremost, the life-cycle age profile is controlled at the individual-level by age and age square terms.
Then, we include controls for ZIP code-level car sales in 2006, the change in the county-level unemployment rate between 2006 and 2009, and a measure of county-level bank health. The first variable among these aggregate controls is useful to capture preexisting differences across ZIP codes in consumption (auto purchase) behavior. We obtain this variable by aggregating our individual-level auto loan origination variable. The second variable is a key measure for capturing the general equilibrium effect in Figure 1 . Finally, bank health, which we construct using one of Chodorow-Reich (2014)'s bank-level measures, distributed to counties using banks' branch shares in the county, is used to control for a county-wide decline in availability of bank credit. By using the richness of our dataset in terms of information on borrower characteristics, we interact these control variables with a number of categories, which may be as detailed as homeowners with a high Equifax Risk Score who have a fixedrate first mortgage, no second mortgage and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio less than 50%, as an example.
Our results are as follows. Using both datasets, we identify the effect of the combined household wealth and financial constraints channel as accounting for 40-45% of the overall consumption response to house prices. The contribution of the decline in credit supply to households is estimated to be 20-25%. The rest, roughly 35%, as shown in Figure 1 , is a general equilibrium effect that combines the feedback through reduced consumption, as well as the direct effect of the decline in credit supply to firms. In order to measure further the contribution of a wealth effect, we focus our analysis on a very specific group of consumers, which we can identify thanks to the detailed information we have in our data.
These consumers have high Equifax Risk Scores, own their houses outright or "free and clear" and have not moved between 2006 and 2009. Owing to these characteristics, especially the absence of a mortgage, we expect that the only reason these consumers react to a decline in house prices will be the result of a wealth effect. We demonstrate that, once other aggregate controls are introduced, these consumers do not react to house prices, indicating that wealth effect is negligible. This leads us to conclude that the 40-45% contribution we referred to above is solely due to households' financial constraints.
We also consider an instrumental variables (IV) strategy to account for the endogeneity of house prices and unemployment, as well as a possible omitted variable bias. We follow Aladangady (2017) , Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2008) , and Saiz (2010) to construct our instruments for house prices. As in those papers, we exploit the variation in lower land availability and tighter land use regulations that create differences in house prices across counties. We also construct a Bartik-type instrument following Keys, Tobacman, and Wang (2017) for employment changes. Our results regarding a negligible wealth effect continues to hold in our IV specification. The contribution of household financial constraints decline slightly to 35%, while the contribution of the decline in bank credit supply to households increase to roughly 50%. This is intuitive, since the existence of constrained households and a change in house prices in a given locality can be simultaneously determined by other characteristics of the locality, which will be controlled once house prices are instrumented for. Hence the role of exogenous-to-household bank credit supply effect increases.
Using information on mortgage characteristics further, we are also able to describe the possible reasons why financial constraints affect consumers. We distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post credit constraints. Ex-ante constraints are those that were in place in 2006, before house prices declined, while ex-post constraints arise, as we demonstrate, primarily as a result of the decline in house prices between 2006 and 2009. We show that segments of the population that are most affected by ex-ante credit constraints, such as those that do not have high Equifax Risk Scores, have large LTVs, those that have adjustable-rate first mortgages, those that have closed-end second mortgages, or those that have a combination of these characteristics, respond much stronger to changes in house prices. These responses are up to an order of magnitude larger than those of much less constrained groups mentioned above.
Taking into account both the response of these constrained groups and their population weights, at least 70% of the consumption response due to financial constraints are as a result of ex-ante constraints. Regarding ex-post credit constraints, we show that the decline in house prices is a strong predictor of whether the Equifax Risk Score of a consumer falls in 2009, especially for those who were borrowers with a high Equifax Risk Score and a moderate-to-large LTV in 2006. We argue that this is because these borrowers default or fall behind on their mortgages, which reduces their Equifax Risk Scores. This, in turn, means that they have difficulty in getting a loan to purchase a car, which leads to the reduction in their consumption.
The closest paper to our work is by Aladangady (2017) . To the best of our knowledge, this is the only other paper using individual-level data to investigate the consumption response to change in house prices. He finds results similar to ours in terms of importance of householdlevel financial constraints. There are two main differences between our paper and his. First, we can account for general equilibrium effects and the effect of bank health. Second, we have much larger and detailed individual-level data that help us identify both ex-ante and ex-post borrowing constraints. His key variables to identify constrained households are refinancing, household leverage and debt service, whereas we have direct data on loan types and individuals' credit risk. His results point to the key role played by financial constraints, whereas our results give an equal role to these constraints and bank health once endogeneity is accounted for.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the data in detail. Section 3 presents our econometric methodology, including the IV analysis. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
Data
This section introduces our individual-level data in detail. We will go over the sources of data first and then explain how we construct our variables and show descriptive statistics. 
Data Sources
Our main dataset is the Federal Reserve Bank of New York/Equifax Consumer Credit Panel (CCP), a quarterly database of consumer credit bureau records for a random 5 percent sample of consumers with a bureau record. We restrict attention to primary CCP consumers.
Available data fields include total balances and aggregate delinquency status on a variety of consumer credit obligations such as mortgages, auto loans and credit cards, the proprietary Equifax Risk Score, as well as some loan-level information on first and second mortgages.
We are also able to calculate the age of consumers based on the birth year that is provided in CCP. As can be seen from Figure 2 , which shows the share of a county within total US census population versus the share of that county within total CCP, this dataset is representative of the broader population. matched data give more detailed information on the borrower's mortgages, most notably the appraised value of the property (which allows us to calculate a loan-to-value ratio); interest rate; other characteristic such as whether it is fixed or adjustable rate, low documentation, etc.; and monthly mortgage performance information. We further restrict attention to those borrowers who appear in CCP (recall that this is a random 5% sample), so that we have a full panel of credit bureau variables for them.
Defining Groups of Individuals in CCP and in CRISM
Our base CCP dataset consists of 6.5 million consumers who are in the sample in both 4. Moving homeowners are those with a mortgage in both endpoints but whose address changed in the interim. The first panel in Table in 1 shows the share of different types of individuals in the data. Renters make up 23% of the sample, free-and-clear homeowners 10%, non-moving homeowners 34%, moving homeowners 2%, and miscellaneous 30%. Our analysis will focus mostly on the first three groups, since we can clearly identify their types and argue that they constitute fairly uniform groups. The other two groups, especially the last one, are ones with a great deal of heterogeneity that is hard to disentangle.
For the CRISM dataset, we similarly restrict attention to borrowers who have the same 1. LTV0, less than or equal to 50% 2. LTV1 above 50% and less than or equal to 80% 3. LTV2 above 80% and less than or equal to 125%.
These groups roughly represent low, moderate and high levels of LTV. From the second panel of Table 1 , we see that 54% of consumers fall in the lowest category, 33% in the moderate group, and 13% in the high LTV group.
We further classify borrowers in order to analyze the effect of house price changes on consumption, based on information on the borrowers' mortgages at the end of 2006, thanks to the detailed information coming through CRISM. We define five categories, and the third panel of Table 1 reports the shares of these categories in our sample. First, for borrowers who do not have a second mortgage in December 2006, we break them up into three groups, based on information from McDash on their first lien:
1. fixed-rate first lien (52% of total sample), 2. adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) with a fixed period of less than five years (5%), 3. ARM with a fixed period of five years or more (4%).
Then for borrowers with a second lien, we construct two additional categories, depending on the second mortgage type, dropping 1.8% of our sample who have both types of second liens:
1. closed-end second (9%), 2. home equity line of credit (HELOC) (30%).
An important piece of data we have, which helps distinguish our work from some of the recent literature, is the Equifax Risk Score of the individual on a quarterly basis. Instead of Figure 3 : Distribution of Fraction of Non-prime Borrowers Across ZIP Codes using this score directly in our analysis, we create two groups based on Equifax Risk Scores.
We define a consumer as:
1. non-prime if he has an Equifax Risk Score of below 700 10 ;
2. prime those with Equifax Risk Scores of 700 or higher are denoted as prime borrowers.
The prime share in the CCP dataset is 58%. It is 75% in CRISM, which higher since homeowners (CRISM by definition is exclusively composed of homeowners) have higher Equifax
Risk Scores. Figure 3 shows the distribution of ZIP codes with respect to the fraction of non-prime borrowers. This shows that a vast majority of ZIP codes have a mixture of prime and non-prime borrowers, and thus ZIP code-level variables and the individual-level indicator of prime status will contain largely independent information. Table 1 also shows the breakdown of each of the other categories we defined above with respect to prime status.
While not central to our analysis, there are some interesting observations such as renters being predominantly non-prime or non-mover homeowners being predominantly prime. .09
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Construction of Consumption Proxy
We proxy for consumption by computing auto loan originations. As the credit bureau dataset does not give information on individual auto loans, we impute originations by tracking changes in total balances. For a given consumer in a particular quarter in the credit bureau dataset, we identify an auto loan origination by an increase in total auto loan balances of at least $1,000, relative to the previous quarter. and they are also relatively more likely to take out an auto loan to finance their purchase.
Using loan originations brings with it the following advantages. First, we are able to capture both new as well as used car sales, whereas Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) only have new car registrations available to them. This is an important feature of our analysis, as new vehicles make up only 38% of all consumer auto purchases.
14 In addition, we are able to focus our analysis on household purchases, whereas the measure used by Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) also includes business purchases. Finally, the most important advantage of our data is that it is at the individual level, and since it is obtained from credit bureau data, we are also able to exploit other individual-level characteristics found in our datasets, rather than basing our analysis solely on aggregate measures. 
Descriptive Statistics
In Federal Reserve Board (2016) . Furthermore, the new car share is pro-cyclical, which would tend to heighten the cyclical behavior of their measure.
15 Another shortcoming of our measure is that it is a binary variable and we do not know the value of the auto purchased. However this is also similar to the variable used by Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) who start by car registrations, which do not have any value attached to them, and then aggregate to a dollar value using an aggregate auto sales measure produced by the Census Bureau. See Section 2.5 for more details. other things constant, for example, those between Manhattan and Los Angeles, which have similar characteristics in many dimensions, except for the prevalence of car ownership. This variable is in $1,000 per capita, and it averages $7,150 in CCP and $7,950 in CRISM.
Our final aggregate variable, Bank Health, is a county-level version of a key indicator of bank health as provided by Chodorow-Reich (2014) . We start with the bank-level measure of the fraction of the syndication portfolio where Lehman Brothers had a lead role. Next, we collect information on how many branches/affiliates each bank has located in each of the U.S. counties. 16 The final step is to distribute the national value of the banks to counties by using the share of branches each bank has in each county. 17 The resulting variable will be such that a higher value indicates worse bank health and will capture a decline in the 16 Lists of branches and their addresses are from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council's (FFIEC) and the banks' websites. ZIP codes of banks' addresses are then matched with the county names using the FIPS county-code sheet from US Census. When a ZIP code is shared by two or more counties, we manually look up that branch's address in Google Maps to determine which county it belongs to.
17 For example, if there are two banks in a county with national bank health values of X 1 and X 2 and B 1 and B 2 branches in a county, then the county's bank health will be (B 1 X 1 + B 2 X 2 )/(B 1 + B 2 ). availability of credit in the county.
In some of our analysis, we address the endogeneity of house prices using two instruments.
Both of these instruments capture the elasticity of housing supply and therefore the response of house prices to demand shocks. First is the share of land in the borrower's MSA that is unavailable for real estate development, from Saiz (2010) , which reflects physical constraints governing land development. In addition, we use the MSA-level Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index (WRLURI) from Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2008) . The WRLURI is a summary measure of the stringency of the local regulatory environment in each MSA, based both on local and state-level factors, with higher levels reflecting greater stringency.
We also construct a Bartik-style instrument for the change in county-level unemployment 
ZIP Code-Level Analysis
To obtain a ZIP code-level dataset analogous to that of Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) Table 3 shows our replication of the results reported in column (5) in Table V 
Empirical Strategy: Individual-Level Analysis
As we explained in the previous section, our key dependent variable, auto loan originations for an individual in 2009, is a binary variable. We conduct our analysis by estimating various linear probability models using ordinary least squares (OLS) or instrumental variables (IV).
Results are very similar if we use a probit model instead of a linear probability model.
The generic equation we estimate in either of our datasets is
where the subscripts i, z and c refer to an individual, a ZIP code and a county. The dependent variable shows whether the individual originated an auto loan in 2009. We control for any lifecycle effects by a quadratic polynomial in age.
In our full model, we have four other controls, each of which are interacted with a full set of individual-level categorical variables. These controls, denoted by X z j c , are ZIP code-level house price change, ∆HP, county-level change in the unemployment rate, ∆U, the 2006 ZIP code auto sales control ZIP Control and the county-level bank health variable Bank Health in (1). We keep the age polynomial, ∆HP and ZIP Control in all regressions, and in addition to the full model, consider specifications that exclude one or both of the remaining two control variables. These regressions help us identify the key channels of the effect of house prices, as we explain shortly.
All four of our control variables are interacted by a full set of dummy variables obtained from up to three individual-level categorical variables, which are denoted by C In all our estimations, we cluster standard errors at the ZIP code level. Since our estimations result in tens of coefficient estimates, we focus on one key number, the average marginal impact of a unit change in ∆HP, and report it either in aggregate or for various subcategories j. In OLS, this naturally amounts to the sum of the appropriate combinations of β jk . We compute the standard error of these marginal impacts using the delta method.
We use three regressions in each of our datasets in order to identify the importance of the three channels for explaining the effect of changes in house prices on consumption. We start by using only ∆HP and ZIP Control as controls. We record the marginal impact for ∆HP and normalize this to 100. Next, we add ∆U to the model and compute the marginal impact for ∆HP in this model. Controlling for ∆U typically reduces the marginal impact for ∆HP, and this decline relative to the marginal impact we obtained in the first regression is our measure of the general equilibrium effect. Next, we add Bank Health in to the regression and compute the marginal impact for ∆HP -this is our full model. The difference between this and the one we computed from the second regression is our measure of the effect of the decline in bank credit supply to households. Finally, after using all the controls, what remains in terms of the marginal impact of ∆HP is the combination of household wealth and household credit constraints.
We identify the magnitude of the wealth effect using three segments of the population, two using CCP and one using CRISM. These are (a) prime homeowners who have a fixed-rate mortgage, no second mortgage and an LTV that is less than 50%. Recall that for us to label it wealth effect, a consumer should react to a change in house prices only because it reduces his wealth and not because some constraints the consumer faces either today or in the future become more binding, or because the change in house prices is correlated with other aggregate things (such as unemployment risk) he cares about. All three segments of the population we use for this purpose fit this broad definition.
First, because they are all prime, they are less sensitive to aggregate conditions we may not be controlling for. Second, the free-and-clear group does not hold a mortgage, and thus they have no financial constraints that are directly related to house prices. Similarly, the second and third groups are least likely to have binding financial constraints. Those in the third group are especially relevant since they are not worried about their mortgage terms changing when house prices change. Moreover, with a low LTV, they are immune to the adverse effects of large changes in house prices -for example, it would take a decline in house prices over 50% to wipe out the equity in their houses, which happened for only a small fraction of homeowners in our sample.
The change in house prices and employment are endogenous. Note that while it is not plausible that individual-level auto loan originations affect ZIP code-level house prices or county-level employment, and hence we do not worry about reverse causality, nevertheless an omitted factor, either at the ZIP code or county-level may drive our dependent and independent variables simultaneously. This is why we instrument both house prices changes and employment changes. We follow the literature in instrumenting house prices changes with the elasticity of housing supply and for employment changes we construct a Bartik-type instrument.
Results
This section presents our decomposition results, first with CCP and then with CRISM. We then provide IV results. 
Decomposition of Channels using CCP
We begin by estimating the model using CCP. As we discussed earlier, CCP is representative of the U.S. population, and as we now demonstrate, it contains a large degree of heterogeneity. The first row shows the overall marginal impact of the change in house prices on consumption. Before controlling for key aggregate variables, the marginal impact on consumption is 0.0353, and it is highly significant. To put this number in perspective, since the average change in house prices is −18.4, our results show that the probability of originating a car loan goes down by about 0.65 percentage point. Considering that the unconditional probability of originating an auto loan is 8.56%, this is a sizable response.
Controlling for ∆U reduces the effect of house prices by 35%, and controlling for Bank
Health reduces it by a further 25%. These results constitute our first key result. Out of the overall response of consumption to house prices measured without controls (except for ZIP-code sales in 2006), 35% is explained by general equilibrium effects and 25% of it is explained by the decline in credit due to deteriorating bank health. The remaining 40% is the direct effect of house prices on consumption -the leftmost arrow in Figure 1 . Much of the rest of the paper will be devoted to understanding and further decomposing this 40%
response.
In the rest of Table 4 , we show how various subgroups in our sample are affected by the change in house prices and how this varies across different specifications. In CCP, we have two main categories: prime and non-prime, and the five homeownership categories we defined in Section 2. The third and fourth rows of Table 4 show the results for the prime and non-prime groups and the next five rows show the results for each homeownership category.
Finally the next three rows show the results for prime individuals who belong to one of the three key homeownership categories. Looking at the first column reveals the extent of heterogeneity: non-prime consumers react almost twice as much as prime consumers and homeowners with a mortgage who have moved respond four times as much as those that did not move. Controlling for ∆U reduces the responses across the board, but all groups show highly statistically significant responses. When we also control for Bank Health in the last column, some very interesting results emerge. First, prime consumers' reactions to changes in house prices become insignificant. Second, looking deeper, the reactions of prime consumers in all three important homeownership categories become insignificant. This shows that the strong responses for these groups that we found in the first column were not actually due to the decline in house prices but rather were due to other aggregate developments (such as an increase in unemployment or a decline in bank health), which are related to but distinct from the decline in house prices. Third, despite the decline in the overall response, there is still considerable heterogeneity in responses: homeowners with a mortgage who have moved now respond over five times as much as those who did not.
The results for the two homeowner groups allow us to disentangle the household wealth effect and the effect of household financial constraints. Consumers that are prime and either own their home without a mortgage or have a mortgage and have not moved would be most immune to any other effect of house price changes but the wealth effect. Thus, the results for these groups allow us to conclude that the wealth effect is negligible, and all of the 40% that we attributed to the wealth effect and the effect of household financial constraints is indeed due to the latter. Notes: (***), (**) and (*) denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Decomposition of Channels using CRISM
In this section, we confirm that the results regarding the decomposition of the house price response also hold using CRISM. We do so using OLS, like we did with CCP in the previous section, as well as an IV specification that accounts for the endogeneity in house price and unemployment changes.
The first panel of Table 5 shows the results from CRISM analogous to Table 4 . To keep things simple, we only report results for the prime and non-prime groups, the three LTV groups and the prime LTV0 group. The first two rows show that the overall results are larger than those for CCP but remarkably similar in terms of the percentage changes across columns reported in the second row. Controlling for the change in unemployment reduces the house price response by 36%, and further controlling for bank health reduces the response by another 20%.
Looking at the rest of the first panel of Table 5 , we see that the largest effect of controlling for the change in unemployment and bank health was on prime consumers, whose response goes down by almost 70%. This lead to the response of non-prime consumers being 3.5 times that of prime consumers. As we further show in the next section, the non-prime response itself is very heterogenous. LTV is also an important determinant of their consumption response: those with low LTVs have a negligible response while those with higher LTVs show sizable responses; those with LTVs greater than 80% respond more than 2.5 times as much as the average.
Finally, in CRISM, we argue we can identify the wealth effect by prime consumers whose LTV is less than 50%. This group does not show a statistically significant response once we properly include the controls. Thus, we again conclude that the wealth effect is negligible.
Our discussion so far has focused on the effect of the house price changes on consumption and how controlling for the change in the unemployment rate or bank health is crucial for properly measuring this effect. However, it is important to emphasize that these two variables actually do more than just absorbing some of the effect of house prices on consumption. The second panel of Table 5 shows how each of the three variables contributes to explaining the probability of originating an auto loan. To ease interpretation, we report the change in origination probability due to each variable, which multiplies the marginal effect of each variable by its average value. For reference, recall that the unconditional probability of originating an auto loan in the CRISM sample is 13.9%. Without other controls, ∆HP would create a decline of 1.39 percentage points, which, at 10% of the unconditional probability, is substantial. Once other controls are introduced, this falls to 0.61 percentage point. In contrast, the average change in unemployment reduces the origination probability by 1.83
percentage points, and the average bank health reduces it by 3.64 percentage points. This shows that the two aggregate controls have very important independent effects on consumption.
We also conduct an IV estimation using CRISM in order to take into account endogeneity and omitted variable problems. We introduced the three instruments we use in Section 2. Since our full specification includes interactions of what we consider to be endogenous variables in this IV (∆HP and ∆U) and individual-level dummy variables, instead of estimating the model using the full sample, we estimate separate IV models for each subsample. Notes: (***), (**) and (*) denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. This is equivalent to, and simpler than, running a single IV regression. We do this using six subsamples where we group consumers based on their prime status and LTV. Our results are presented in Table 6 . The first panel shows the first stages in one of the subgroups as an example. All other subgroups have very similar first stage estimates both in terms of signs and magnitudes. All first stages pass weak and under-identification tests.
The second panel shows the marginal effects for each subgroup for the three specifications in terms of which controls are included. There are some significant differences relative to the OLS results -IV results are typically larger. Focusing on the breakdown at the last row, which is computed as the weighted average of the six subsample results, the importance of ∆U is smallerthan the OLS results at 16%, and the importance of the bank credit supply to households is larger at nearly 50%. The wealth effect is still negligible, as shown by the response of prime LTV0 borrowers. 
Household Financial Constraints
Our results so far show that between 35% and 44% of the overall consumption response to house price changes is driven by household financial constraints. In this section, we investigate further and attempt to identify which constraints are responsible for this large response.
We think of financial constraints in two broad categories: ex-ante and ex-post. By exante financial constraints, we mean those that affected consumers in 2006 or earlier, before house prices declined. Ex-post constraints are those that affected consumers in 2009 and those constraints likely tightened at least in part because of the decline in house prices.
Our detailed individual-level data allow us to cut the data various ways to identify these constraints.
Ex-Ante Constraints
We provide three ways of observing ex-ante financial constraints at work. The first two are shown in Table 8 . Here, using CRISM, we show how the interaction of LTV and prime status affects the consumption response to ∆HP. This is just a more detailed breakdown of the results in Table 5 . There are three clear conclusions. 0.0651 (***) 0.1100 (***) 0.0764 (***) Overall 0.0186 (***) 0.0647 (***) 0.0298 (***)
Notes: (***), (**) and (*) denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. each show no response to ∆HP, either being non-prime or having a higher LTV has a large impact. Third, not surprisingly, the interaction of the two creates a significant consumption response. Once again, following appropriate rescaling, the 0.1100 marginal effect we show corresponds to a 1.5 percentage point decline in the probability of an auto loan origination.
We view both of these characteristics as being a sign of having constraints in 2006. Being non-prime shows the presence of some adverse credit activity, and this further influences the type of credit the consumer gets access to. Moreover, non-prime status very persistent. the LTV, the more constrained the consumer, and thus the more vulnerable he is to house price changes. To sum up, both of these characteristics have implications about how easy it is for the consumers to refinance their mortgage, how likely it is for them to default and more generally how constrained they are.
The third way of identifying ex-ante constraints in our data is presented in Table 9 . To produce this table, we repeat our benchmark CRISM estimation, but in addition to prime status and LTV, we include a third layer of interaction with the mortgage type variable defined in Section 2.1. To see how mortgage type is a sign of ex-ante constraints, note that borrowers are not allocated randomly to different mortgage types, but they select the mortgage that best suits their situation, including financial constraints they face. For example, borrowers with closed-end second mortgages typically get these mortgages because they lack the resources to make a 20% down payment, the standard amount in most mortgages.
Further analyzing the distribution of consumers in Table 1 , we see a few more interesting patterns that suggest choices by consumers. For example, short-maturity ARMs seem to be Notes: (***), (**) and (*) denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Color coding in cells show the weight of each cell in the overall CRISM population using the distribution reported in Table 1 . Green represents a group with more than 10% weight, yellow shows a weight between 5% and 10% and purple shows a group that has a weight between 1% and 5%. chosen by prime low-LTV borrowers (perhaps because they intend to pay off their loan in a short period of time) or non-prime moderate-LTV borrowers (perhaps because this was the only product they qualified for and they hope to refinance before the ARM resets). HELOCs seem to be favored by prime borrowers with low-to-moderate LTVs. It is plausible that these consumers use the extra liquidity from their HELOCs to finance some consumption expenditures. Thus, a decline in house prices would make their constraints bind, since banks can (and did) reduce HELOC limits for consumers with increased LTVs.
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The first panel of Table 9 shows the marginal impact of house price changes, broken down into these three categories. To focus on the important results, we use colors to show 20 One may be tempted to think consumers can use cash they get from their HELOCs to finance an auto purchase completely without the need for an auto loan. If this was the case, then it is not clear how we could identify our results using auto loan originations for people with HELOCs. Results reported by McCully and Vine (2015) , however, show -using data from three nationally representative surveys -that very few consumers purchase cars outright using HELOCs or cash-out refinancing.
the weight of each subgroup in the whole population using the distribution in Table 1 .
Green represents a group with more than 10% weight, yellow shows a weight between 5% and 10% and purple shows a group that has a weight between 1% and 5%. We find that prime borrowers with a fixed-rate mortgage and a low LTV, who represent over 23% of the population, do not respond to changes in house prices. This is yet another indication that the wealth effect is not important, as these consumers would have no financial constraints.
We find significant responses for the remainder of the fixed-rate group who have higher LTVs and/or are non-prime. There are negligible responses from consumers with short-maturity ARMs. Prime consumers with long-maturity ARMs, on the other hand, respond strongly and negatively to house price changes. This means they benefited from the decline in house prices. Consumers with closed-end second mortgages seem to be the most responsive group; those who are non-prime and have high LTVs respond more than 7 times the average. Finally, consumers with HELOCs who also have moderate-to-high LTVs show significant responses.
While the results in the preceding paragraph are interesting, they do not fully answer our main goal of finding out what constraints are responsible for the large response of consumption to house prices. To do so, we compute the contribution of each cell in the first panel of Table 9 to the overall response. This amounts to taking the marginal effect of a particular group, multiplying by the weight in population in Table 1 , and dividing by the overall response. Results are reported in the second panel of Table 9 . To ease interpretation, we highlight cells that show a contribution grater than 10%.
We find that almost 60% of the consumption response to changes in house prices comes from consumers with fixed-rate mortgages, particularly those that are non-prime (29%) or are prime and have moderate-to-high LTV s(26%). The contribution from consumers with ARMs is negligible. Consumers with second mortgages constitute about 40% of the response, with those with closed-end second mortgages at 27%.
Our reading of these results is as follows. We associate all of the non-prime response, amounting to 59%, with ex-ante constraints. Similarly, any mortgage choice other than a fixed rate mortgage also shows the presence of ex-ante constraints, accounting for an additional 11%. Thus, our results indicate that at least 70% of the house price response, stripped of any general equilibrium and bank credit effects (recall that this itself is 44% of the full response), is due to ex-ante credit constraints. Notes: The table reports the marginal effect of each characteristic given in a cell to the probability of becoming non-prime in 2009, expressed in percentage points. Unconditional probability of being non-prime in 2009 is 26%. (***), (**) and (*) denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Ex-Post Constraints
To demonstrate the importance of ex-post financial constraints, those that become more binding because of the decline in house prices, we consider a simple analysis. We use the same is precisely how our concept of ex-post constraints work. Table 10 shows the results. Here, to ease interpretation, all marginal effects are converted to change in the probability of becoming non-prime. To put things in perspective, the unconditional probability of being non-prime in 2009 is 26%. It is also helpful to note that even after controlling for the effects of the control variables, being non-prime in 2006 increases the probability of being non-prime in 2009 by 15 percentage points. Table 10 shows that the average decline in house prices lead to a 3.53 percentage point increase in the probability of an average person becoming non-prime in 2009. This is already very sizable. When we look at those who were prime in 2006 and especially those who had moderate-to-high LTVs, the increase in probability is 1.5 to 2.5 times larger -as high as 8.78
percentage points for prime borrowers who had a high LTV in 2006. Borrowers that were non-prime in 2006, on the other hand, are much less affected by the house price declinethe average effect is about half of the overall effect. This is because of the large persistence in non-prime status we mentioned above.
Our results regarding prime borrowers in 2006 explain why in Table 9 about 40% of the response to house prices comes from prime borrowers. While some of them certainly could have financial constraints that influence them in 2006, at least for some, their reaction to consumption is due to the simple reason that they have become non-prime due to the decline in house prices. We think that this is likely due to the consumer falling behind on his mortgage payments (either voluntarily or involuntarily). This, in turn, reduced the creditworthiness of the consumer to the point where we label him non-prime. Crucially, it also means that he is less likely to qualify for an auto loan, and thus we observe that he reduces his consumption.
It is important to emphasize that this result seems to also be relevant for the current debate in the literature in terms of whether the boom period mortgage borrowing was driven by prime and sub-prime borrowers. Albanesi, De Giorgi, and Nosal (2017) show that borrowing in sub-prime ZIP codes is driven by prime borrowers in those ZIP codes, whereas borrowing by subprime individuals was constant in the boom period. Our results of prime borrowers turning into non-prime because of a decline in house prices is consistent with these findings, given that prime borrowers did most of the borrowing during the boom period, and they then fell behind on their payments.
Conclusion
We use individual-level data to decompose the response of consumption to declining house prices during 2006-2009. We find that the wealth effect is not important for this response, whereas financially constrained households and lower credit supply from banks who got hit by the crisis explain most of the response. Our decomposition exercise is based on accounting for the role of employment changes and bank health in a given county and identifying the groups of individuals carefully so that persons exposed to wealth effects and a possible tightening of financial constraints can be investigated separately.
In terms of our estimates, tightening household-level financial constraints can explain 40-45 percent of the response of consumption to declining house prices. Deteriorating bank health leads to reduced credit supply to households, which explains 20-25 percent of the consumption response. The remaining 35 percent is a general equilibrium effect that works via a decline in employment as a result of either lower credit supply to firms or the feedback from lower consumer demand.
Using elasticity for housing supply and prior national sectoral employment growth as instruments for changes in house prices and unemployment, we run IV regressions. Our estimate of a negligible wealth effect is robust to accounting for the endogeneity of house prices and unemployment. The contribution of tightening household financial constraints goes down to 35 percent, whereas declining bank credit supply to households captures about half of the overall consumption response, once we account for endogeneity.
